The Rationality of Despair: Hegasias, Schopenhauer, and Tillich on the Value of Life.
Exploring Existential Courage and the Ethics of Suicide in the Face of Unrelenting Suffering.
For a few years, I have wanted to write about Cyrenaic philosophy. Of those ancients who followed Aristippus, the one who stands out the most is Hegesius, the so-called ‘death persuader’. Unfortunately, we have nothing from Hegesias besides a passing paragraph from Diogenes Laertius and a token discussion from Cicero. Nevertheless, the fact that an ethical philosopher convinced people, according to Cicero, to commit suicide always made me wonder why someone would advocate this conclusion from a pleasure philosophy.
So, by momentarily becoming a Hegesiac, I aim to explore his philosophical thought and challenge the uncritical assumptions embedded in the modern discourse on the value of life. I believe Hegasias forces us to consider whether our commitment to life’s intrinsic worth is rational or merely a comforting societal illusion. In what follows, I will use Hegesias as the ‘thesis’ and Paul Tillich as the ‘antithesis’. Along the way, I will highlight an interesting consideration regarding Schopenhauer and Hegesias. However, I do not apologise for the existential themes scattered through these thoughts; that is my burden, and I ask you to go along with it. So, let’s get to into the Rationality of Despair.
Introduction: Confronting the Precariousness of Human Existence.
Hegasias of Cyrene, often dismissed as a morbid advocate of death, provides one of the most extreme and logically rigorous challenges to the value of life amidst unrelenting suffering. His thought confronts not merely suffering but the very foundations of life’s worth. This essay seeks to vindicate Hegasias’ radical position by situating it within the Cyrenaic tradition of hedonism, juxtaposing it against Schopenhauer’s pessimism, and, crucially, engaging it with Paul Tillich’s concept of the Courage to Be. Through these intellectual currents, we confront Hegasias’ essential question: is there a reason to persist in life if its fundamental condition is suffering?
In modern philosophical and medical discourse, suicide is generally framed as irrational, a consequence of poor mental health or impaired judgment. Yet, I maintain that Hegasias of Cyrene presents one of the most extreme and uncomfortable challenges to the value of life amidst unrelenting suffering. His philosophy is not merely a morbid fascination with death but a rigorous confrontation with the foundations of life’s worth. I want to consider Hegasias' radical position, which forces us to ask an unsettling question: is life genuinely worth living if its fundamental condition is suffering?
1. The Cyrenaic Context: The Fragility of Pleasure
To understand Hegasias, we must first locate his argument within the Cyrenaic school of philosophy. The Cyrenaics, under the leadership of Aristippus the elder (Aristippus the younger is his grandson and took Cyrenic hedonism in a more Epicurean direction, and Hegesias turned it into a negative pleasure view compared to Annicerus’ more positive pleasure view), espoused a hedonistic ethic that defined pleasure as the highest good (or agreeable) and pain as the greatest evil (or disagreeable). However, unlike Epicurean hedonism, which sought to maximise pleasure through moderation and long-term stability, the Cyrenaics emphasised immediate, sensual pleasure. They acknowledged that pleasure is fleeting, and any attempt to secure long-term happiness is inherently doomed to fail.
As a rough guide to Aristippus of Cyrene, the founder of Cyrenaic hedonism, he maintained that the highest good was the pursuit of immediate, sensual pleasure. Pain and pleasure are the only two states or motions of the soul. Pleasure does not come in degrees and is agreeable; pain is disagreeable to all living beings. For them, bodily pleasure is the goal and does not arrive from the removal of pain. Happiness is the sum of particular pleasures - including past and future. Pleasure is good, even if it results in shameful conduct. Since bodily pleasure is the goal, bodily pleasure is more important than mental pleasure. However, unlike Hegasias, Aristippus believed that a life of adaptable pleasure-seeking, where one exercises a kind of strategic indulgence, allowed for moments of happiness amidst life’s uncertainties. For Aristippus, the key to happiness was learning to enjoy pleasures without being enslaved. Aristippus championed adaptability, claiming that pleasure—though fleeting—could still offer a life of value if approached without enslavement. Hegesias takes this insight and inverts it. Where Aristippus saw opportunity, Hegesias saw delusion: life’s unpredictability and inevitable suffering fundamentally flawed any pursuit of pleasure. Hegesias dismantles the Cyrenaic notion that pleasure, in any form, can mitigate life’s misery.
Hegasias’ radical departure stems from his rejection of this optimism. Rather than viewing life’s pleasures as manageable or navigable, Hegasias fixates on the sheer fragility of pleasure and the inevitability of suffering. Commonly held goods such as friendship, gratitude, and benefits do not exist apart from the advantages they afford us. The body being infected with many sufferings renders happiness wholly impossible, and since happiness is wholly impossible, happiness does not exist. In this view, the ‘wise man’ will do everything with an eye for their interests since nobody else is deserving. The wise man's goal is to live without pain, an advantage afforded by those indifferent to the sources of pleasure (D.L 2: 91-96). He takes the Cyrenaic insight to its logical conclusion: if we cannot secure long-term pleasure due to life’s unpredictability and the inevitability of suffering, then the good life, as traditionally defined, is impossible. Aristippus’ view of adaptable pleasure is, for Hegasias, nothing more than a comforting illusion.
Hegasias’ Radical Critique of Adaptability: Hegasias’ philosophy significantly departs from Aristippus’ optimism about adaptability. Where Aristippus believed that one could navigate life’s unpredictability by taking pleasures where they could be found, Hegasias viewed such an attitude as fundamentally misguided. For Hegasias, adaptability is not a practical solution but a delusion—an attempt to impose coherence on a fundamentally incoherent life. He challenges the Cyrenaic assumption that pleasure, however fleeting, can still provide meaning or satisfaction amidst suffering. Instead, Hegasias exposes the darker truth: no strategy of adaptability or flexibility can overcome life’s intrinsic instability, for the pursuit of pleasure is haunted by the shadow of inevitable suffering.
Life is always precarious for the Cyrenaics, as pleasure is subject to external forces we cannot control. Hegasias takes this view further, drawing out the implications of pleasure’s fragility. He questions the pursuit of the good life, as defined by pleasure, in a world where it is impossible to secure and suffering is inevitable. This departure from other Cyrenaics like Aristippus, who still advocated for the pursuit of the good life despite recognising the instability of pleasure, is a key aspect of Hegasias’ philosophy.
Hegasias’ conclusion recognises a stark departure from other hedonists. He does not seek to moderate desires or avoid pain but instead confronts life's essential instability. His suggestion that the most consistent response to life’s instability may be to disengage entirely is a logical extension of his philosophy.
In this sense, Hegasias’ radical critique of adaptability does more than deepen Cyrenaic thought—it overturns it. While Aristippus believed that adaptability and flexibility in pleasure-seeking allowed for moments of happiness, Hegasias exposes this strategy as fundamentally flawed. For him, the pursuit of pleasure, no matter how adaptable, cannot counterbalance life’s inevitable suffering.
2. Hegasias’ Explicit Argument for Death: A Philosophical Reconstruction
Hegasias’ argument for death can be reconstructed as follows:
Pleasure is fleeting and unreliable: Life’s pleasures, as the Cyrenaics affirm, are brief and unsustainable. They offer temporary respite from life’s hardships, never providing enduring satisfaction.
Suffering is constant: In contrast to the fleeting nature of pleasure, suffering—whether physical, emotional, or existential—is pervasive and persistent. It is the defining feature of human existence.
Pursuing pleasure cannot outweigh the pain of existence: Given the transience of pleasure and the inevitability of suffering, the balance of life is tilted toward pain. Even the momentary pleasures we experience are often outweighed by the prolonged periods of suffering and dissatisfaction that follow.
Hegasias’ Critique of Pleasure: Hegasias’ rejection of life goes beyond the simple calculus of suffering versus pleasure. He identifies a more insidious problem at the heart of hedonism: the pursuit of pleasure itself creates pain, or what we can call existential anxiety. For Hegasias, the transient nature of pleasure means that the more we seek it, the more we are reminded of its impermanence. This realisation breeds a deeper sense of dissatisfaction, as the fleeting moments of joy inevitably follow longer periods of lack and frustration. Therefore, the act of seeking pleasure becomes a source of suffering. Hegasias exposes the hollowness of hedonism’s promise, revealing that the endless cycle of desire and disappointment can only lead to existential despair.
Hegasias recognises that even the anticipation of pleasure is fraught with tension and dissatisfaction, aligning with Schopenhauer’s notion of the will’s constant striving. The very pursuit of pleasure becomes a form of suffering, as it entails endless desire and inevitable disappointment. Pleasure, for Hegasias, is not merely fleeting but deeply entangled with suffering. Anticipation creates anxiety, and its fleeting nature leads to the unavoidable realisation that nothing lasting or fulfilling can be secured in life.
Thus, suffering is not an occasional interruption in the flow of pleasure; it is the constant, while pleasure is the exception. Hegasias, recognising this imbalance, concludes that the rational individual must assess life’s value based on its predominant characteristic: suffering. His suggestion that suicide may be a rational choice does not arise from despair or emotional turbulence but from a cold, logical assessment of life’s conditions. Pursuing pleasure, always out of reach, cannot justify enduring the suffering that defines existence.
Death offers the only true liberation from suffering. In light of this, Hegasias argues that death is not merely a cessation of pleasure but the ultimate release from the unending cycle of suffering. One chooses death to escape the ceaseless striving and disappointment that characterises life. Hegesias’ endorsement of death is not a mere escape from suffering but a confrontation with the harshest reality of existence: that life itself is a constant negation of pleasure. By choosing death, one is not yielding to despair but affirming the ultimate truth of life’s futility—a rational, philosophical response to a life that offers only suffering and fleeting joy.
Suicide is a rational option: Hegasias does not claim that everyone should end their life, but rather that when suffering outweighs the possibility of pleasure, the rational choice is to disengage from life. He elevates suicide from a tragic or irrational act to a philosophical decision based on an honest assessment of the human condition.
This framework confronts whether life’s value is intrinsic or contingent on quality. If the latter, as Hegasias suggests, then the rational individual may choose death as the optimal solution to life’s inherent suffering.
3. Modern Anti-Suicide Ideology: A Philosophical Critique
Modern discourses on suicide, primarily influenced by medical, psychological, and ethical frameworks, reject Hegasias’ argument outright. Suicide is framed as a failure of mental health or a tragic distortion of rationality. Therapy, medication, and social intervention are geared toward restoring the individual’s belief in life’s intrinsic value, assuming that suicidal thoughts stem from irrationality or impaired judgment.
However, Hegasias fundamentally challenges the very foundation of this framework by questioning the assumption that life is inherently valuable. From his perspective, modern anti-suicide ideologies rest on comforting but ultimately flawed illusions—that all suffering is treatable and that life’s value persists regardless of its quality. Hegasias would argue that the real irrationality lies in maintaining the blind faith that life is worth preserving, even when the evidence of suffering suggests otherwise. These interventions can thus be seen as tools of existential coercion, forcing individuals to continue living based on society’s unexamined assumptions about life’s value. Hegasias forces us to ask: what if it is not the suicidal person whose reasoning is distorted but the very frameworks that seek to ‘save’ them from death? Could it be that modern anti-suicide ideologies are built upon comforting illusions, promoting the notion that all suffering is treatable and that life’s value is beyond question, no matter the quality of the life in question? Modern anti-suicide frameworks operate under a social imperative that life, regardless of its quality, must be preserved. This imperative overrides existential freedom, placing the individual within a matrix of societal expectations about mental health and well-being. Hegesias exposes the underlying coercion in this approach, revealing how the medicalisation of suffering strips individuals of the right to make rational decisions about their own lives, enforcing a normative narrative of 'health' and 'hope' over existential autonomy.
Moreover, modern anti-suicide ideologies fail in their core assumption that suffering is temporary and subject to improvement. From a Hegasiac perspective, suffering is not an aberration but the essence of life itself. The promise that life will improve—that suffering will be mitigated through therapeutic means or societal change—perpetuates a false hope, binding individuals to lives filled with inevitable suffering for a future happiness that is fleeting at best and illusory. This belief in ‘hopeful suffering’ is a cruel optimism that traps individuals in a life that has already revealed its emptiness and pain. This is where modern thought falls into dogma—the very kind of uncritical belief that Hegasias sought to dismantle. His philosophy invites us to recognise that such beliefs may not be based on rigorous analysis but on a societal need to avoid confronting the harsh reality that life, for many, is defined by suffering.
Modern anti-suicide ideologies function as ideological gatekeepers, insisting that the will to live must always be restored, no matter how unbearable the conditions of life may be. But who gave society the authority to impose its life-affirming values on the individual? It seems that for Hegasias, the insistence that life must be preserved at all costs is an institutionalised form of denial—denial of the inevitability of suffering and the rational choice to disengage from a life that offers nothing but more suffering.
Hegasias challenges this entire ideological framework by arguing that the true irrationality lies not in the desire to die but in the insistence that life is always worth living. To continue living in a state of unrelenting suffering, where pleasure is brief and suffering constant, is, for Hegasias, the height of irrationality. Yet, this is precisely what modern anti-suicide ideologies compel us to do—they ask us to continue playing a game that is rigged from the start, where suffering outweighs pleasure, and where the promise of future relief is often nothing but a mirage.
Furthermore, Hegasias exposes the modern obsession with meaning-making as a mere distraction. Therapy and interventions often focus on helping individuals create meaning in their suffering. Still, this demand for manufacturing meaning in an inherently meaningless existence is, from Hegasias’ view, an act of bad faith. The therapeutic narrative burdens the individual to justify their existence, as though their failure to find meaning is their fault rather than a reflection of life’s intrinsic emptiness. Modern frameworks obscure this reality, encouraging people to hope that meaning can be found rather than confronting the truth that meaning is an artificial construct imposed on a meaningless life.
The biggest failure of modern anti-suicide ideologies, however, is their refusal to grant individuals the autonomy to disengage from life on their terms. By pathologising the desire for death, society denies individuals the right to make rational, autonomous choices about their existence. For Hegasias, the decision to end one’s life is not a sign of mental illness but an expression of existential freedom—the ultimate act of autonomy in a life that offers little else. To deny this choice strips individuals of their existential agency, imposing society’s values over their philosophical conclusions about life’s worth.
In this light, Hegasias would argue that modern anti-suicide ideologies are not only misguided but oppressive. They perpetuate false hopes, deny existential autonomy, and ultimately serve to enforce society’s unwillingness to confront the reality of life’s suffering. Furthermore, Hegasias would critique modern anti-suicide frameworks for infantilising individuals, treating their existential despair as something to be 'corrected' rather than a legitimate philosophical position. For Hegasias, pathologising the desire for death is an act of existential coercion—one that denies individuals the freedom to make rational choices about their existence. The real courage, for Hegasias, lies not in persisting despite suffering but in recognising when life no longer justifies its continuation—and in choosing to let go.
Hegasias invites us to tear down the comforting myths modern ideologies have built around life’s value. The real question is not why someone would choose death but why, given the state of existence, society is so quick to insist on the continuation of life, even in the face of overwhelming suffering. By dismissing suicide as irrational, we fail to engage with the terrifying truth: that life’s value is not a given and that the decision to end one’s life might be the most rational response to life’s fundamental nature. Hegasias dismantles the comforting, modern assumption that suicidal ideation is inherently pathological, asking us to consider whether the frameworks meant to 'save' us from death are tools of existential coercion. What if our medicalisation of suicide is less about protecting the individual and more about society’s deep-seated fear of confronting life’s meaningless suffering? From a Hegesiac perspective, modern interventions are not salvations but control mechanisms, forcing individuals to live for a societal narrative rather than their philosophical conclusion.
That is why, I believe, there is a Hegesiac challenge: Can we truly say that life is worth living when it is filled with so much suffering? Or are we simply too afraid to acknowledge the alternative—that death may be the more rational, courageous option? After all, for the Hegesiac, life and death are of equal desirability.
4. Hegasias and Schopenhauer: Pessimism Taken to Its Logical Conclusion
In many respects, Hegasias’ argument anticipates Schopenhauer’s pessimistic view of existence. Schopenhauer famously posits that life is driven by the unceasing will—a force that perpetually pushes us toward desires we can never fully satisfy. This constant striving results in a cycle of fleeting pleasure and persistent suffering. For Schopenhauer, life is essentially the perpetuation of suffering, punctuated by brief moments of satisfaction.
Schopenhauer famously posited that an unceasing, irrational force drives life—the will to live. This ‘will to live’ propels us toward desires we can never fully satisfy, thereby dooming us to constant striving and suffering. Schopenhauer’s solution to this cycle is ascetic renunciation: by denying the will’s demands, one can dull the pain of existence, achieving a kind of resigned peace.
Hegasias, however, takes this pessimism to its logical extreme. While Schopenhauer advocates for ascetic renunciation to cope with life’s suffering, Hegasias argues that such half-measures fail to address the core issue. As long as we exist, we remain subject to the will and thus to suffering. Hegasias, unlike Schopenhauer, does not believe that suffering can be mitigated by renunciation; instead, suffering can only be entirely escaped through death. In this way, Hegasias’ philosophy can be seen as a more radical extension of Schopenhauer’s pessimism, refusing to settle for partial solutions and instead advocating for complete disengagement from life. While Schopenhauer advocates for ascetic renunciation to dull the will’s demands and reduce suffering, Hegasias believes that even this form of resignation is insufficient. For Hegasias, any solution short of death fails to address the core issue: as long as we exist, suffering is inescapable.
Where Schopenhauer offers ascetic renunciation to lessen the pain of existence, Hegesias refuses this halfway measure. For him, any compromise—ascetic or philosophical—leaves one trapped in the inescapable cycle of suffering. Death, in Hegesias’ view, is the only way to sever oneself from the will to live completely and its attendant misery. This refusal to settle for 'palliatives' highlights the uncompromising nature of Hegesias’ philosophy.
This extension of pessimism raises an important philosophical question: if life is defined by suffering, what ethical justification is there for continuing to live? Hegasias’ position invites us to consider whether the ascetic ideal represents a meaningful solution or a compromise, delaying the inevitable truth that life is not worth living.
5. Tillich’s Courage to Be vs. Hegasias’ Courage to Let Go
By dialectic, I want to turn to a kind of antithesis of Hegesius: Paul Tillich. Perhaps unknowingly, Tillich responds to existential suffering in a way that contrasts sharply with Hegasias’ conclusion. For Tillich, the human condition is marked by three primary forms of existential anxiety: the anxiety of death, the anxiety of meaninglessness, and the anxiety of guilt. These anxieties arise from our confrontation with non-being, the void that threatens to render life meaningless.
Tillich argues that the proper response to this anxiety is not despair but courage—the courage to affirm life in the face of non-being. For Tillich, being requires an existential commitment to living despite the suffering and uncertainty that come with it. The Courage to Be is a call to embrace existence even when confronted with its inherent instability and suffering. However, Tillich’s concept of courage is not merely an affirmation of existence; it is an affirmation of being-itself, which for him, represents a deeper spiritual act of defiance against non-being.
Tillich’s concept of the Courage to Be arises from his metaphysical belief in being-itself, which he sees as the ultimate ground of existence. For Tillich, the courage to affirm life is not merely a decision to endure suffering; it is an act of existential faith, a commitment to the belief that being has value beyond individual suffering. This faith in being-itself allows individuals to confront non-being—the void that threatens to render life meaningless—and to find meaning in the affirmation of existence despite its precariousness.
Hegasias, however, offers a radically different conception of courage. Where Tillich sees courage in affirming life, Hegasias finds courage in rejecting it. For Hegasias, the true confrontation with non-being comes not from affirming existence but from accepting that life’s suffering outweighs its value. Hegasias seems to reject Tillich’s belief in the metaphysical grounding of being-itself, viewing it as another comforting illusion. For Hegasias, no metaphysical commitment can overcome the stark reality of suffering. Tillich’s faith in being represents, to Hegasias, a retreat from the deeper philosophical truth that life’s suffering is inescapable and meaningless. Hegesias, operating with a more 'materialist' framework, would argue that Tillich’s appeal to the intrinsic value of being relies on metaphysical abstractions that ultimately distract from the concrete suffering of existence. For Tillich, courage is in affirming life despite its uncertainty. For Hegesias, the only true courage lies in rejecting life’s inherent futility and embracing non-being as autonomy's final, rational act. In choosing death, Hegasias argues, we demonstrate courage: the courage to let go of comforting illusions and accept the finality of non-being as the only release from suffering.
For Hegasias, life has no intrinsic value, and the courage to live is not an affirmation of being but a clinging to illusions. According to Hegasias, true courage is the courage to see life as it truly is—an existence defined by suffering and fleeting pleasures—and accept non-being as the only escape from this cycle. While Tillich’s courage is rooted in a metaphysical belief in the value of being, Hegasias’ courage is grounded in a radical honesty about the nature of existence.
This contrast presents an intriguing existential dilemma: is courage the affirmation of life’s mystery and meaning, as Tillich suggests, or the rejection of life’s illusions, as Hegasias argues? Both thinkers require us to confront the total weight of human suffering, but their solutions are diametrically opposed.
Conclusion: Re-evaluating Existential Courage and the Value of Life
Synthesising the perspectives of Hegasias, Schopenhauer, and Tillich leads us to a complex and unsettling understanding of existential courage. Hegasias challenges us to reconsider whether life’s value is truly intrinsic or contingent upon our ability to experience fleeting pleasure amidst unending suffering. His critique of modern anti-suicide ideologies cuts through the comforting assumptions that shield us from grappling with the real meaning of suffering—and death.
Tillich’s Courage to Be offers a more hopeful framework, urging us to affirm life in the face of non-being and to find meaning even when life seems futile. Yet, as Hegasias forces us to consider, this affirmation might be a comforting illusion that prevents us from confronting life’s inherent futility. The real courage, for Hegasias, lies not in affirming life’s value but in facing the possibility that there may be none at all.
Ultimately, the debate between Hegasias and Tillich is not merely an abstract philosophical question—it is a direct challenge to the very core of our existence. Will we continue to cling to life’s comforting illusions, or will we dare to confront the terrifying possibility that death, not life, holds the ultimate release from suffering?
The choice between Hegesias and Tillich is not just theoretical but existential. Following Hegesias is confronting the possibility that life’s value is illusory, that suffering may be the only certainty, and that death offers the sole release from its grasp. To follow Tillich is to affirm the possibility of meaning, even in the face of life’s precarity. The choice we make—between affirming life or letting go—directly reflects our deepest philosophical commitments. Hegesias forces us to confront not only the value of life but the courage it takes to accept the consequences of that value.
Andrew.
This is one I’ll have to think about for a while. I appreciate your exposition of these three thinkers and their approach to suffering, life, and death. My gut reaction is that I didn’t find their approaches especially compelling. In a way it does feel like a group of individuals sadly suffering from a depression that colors their outlook and absolutizing and projecting their state of mind onto the world at large.
I don’t mean to trivialize the subject, and certainly not your excellent breakdown of the substance of their arguments. It just seems that some vital components of a much larger and more comprehensive view and approach to the same questions are absent from their reckoning.
I’ll sit with this uncomfortable subject for a while before commenting further. But thank you for your elucidation of this subject.